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What’s Positive and Negative about Generics: 





Nguyen (2020) introduced the positive data and argued that only his 
pragmatic account and Sterken’s (2015a) indexical account can 
accommodate it. In this paper, we will present new data – what we call the 
negative data – and argue that there is no theory on the market that is 
compatible with both the positive data and the negative data. We will draw 
two generalizations from them and develop a novel version of the 
indexical account that captures both the positive data and the negative data. 
In particular, we argue that there is a semantic constraint that, in any 
context, the semantic value of GEN is upward monotone and non-
symmetric. Whereas the indexical account can accommodate these data 
when appropriately modified, the pragmatic account cannot. This is 
because no pragmatic principles have been developed that can explain the 
negative data. While we focus on only the pragmatic account and the 
indexical account, the data and generalizations discussed here are of broad 
interest, as they must be accommodated by any empirically adequate 
account of generics. 
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2. The Positive Data and Its Implication 
Generics, which are often expressed using bare plurals (e.g., “Tigers are 
striped”), have received much attention from both philosophers and 
linguists. 1  But generics have proved resistant to systematic semantic 
theorizing. This is mainly because generics can be used to express 
propositions with radically different quantificational forces: that of 
universal quantifiers (e.g., “all”), modalized universal quantifiers (e.g., 
“all … can,” “ideally, all,” “under normal circumstances, all”), 
proportional quantifiers (e.g., “most,” “many”), and quasi-existential 
quantifiers (e.g., “a few”). Nguyen (2020) calls this data The Variety Data, 
but we prefer to call it The Positive Data:2 
  
The Positive Data (The Variety Data)3,4 
(1) [A few] mosquitoes transmit malaria.5 
 
1 For broad introductions to the literature on generics, see Krifka et al. (1995), Leslie 
(2016), and Sterken (2017). 
2 In the absence of an explicitly supplied context, we will assume typical contexts. Bach 
(2002) and Bach (2005) have argued that in the absence of an explicitly provided context, 
speakers evaluate sentences by imagining a typical one. Some evidence that speakers can 
automatically supply a typical context is the felicity of some sentences containing 
context-dependent expressions despite the absence of any explicitly offered context. For 
example, “She left Bob” can be understood as meaning “Bob’s female ex-partner left 
Bob” despite the lack of any explicitly offered context to help resolve the reference of 
“she.” 
3 Only the unbracketed material is overtly pronounced. The bracketed material indicates 
the quantificational force of what is asserted. 
4 Here are sample lexical entries for the quantifiers in the positive data: 
⟦“all”⟧c = λF. λG. 
#(F&G)
#F
 = 1 
⟦“almost all”⟧c = λF. λG. 
#(F&G)
#F
  n, where n is some number very close to 1 (e.g., 0.9).  
⟦“most”⟧c = λF. λG. 
#(F&G)
#F
  > 0.5. 
⟦“many”⟧c = λF. λG. 
#(F&G)
#F
   0.3. 
⟦“a few”⟧c = λF. λG. 
#(F&G)
#F
   n, where n is some number very close to 0 (e.g., 0.01).  
5 The proportional reading of “a few”, not its cardinal reading, is intended. 
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(2) [Many] barns are red. 
(3) [All] prime numbers are odd. 
(4) [Under normal circumstances, almost all] ravens are black. 
(5) [By definition, all] round squares are round. 
(6) [Ideally, all] boys don’t cry. 
(7) [Most] orange crushers [can] crush oranges. 
  
Nguyen (2020) argues that only his account and Sterken’s (2015a) can 
accommodate this data. Intuitively, the problem with other accounts is that 
they are not context-sensitive enough to capture the intended meanings. 
They seem to excessively constrain what generics may be used to assert.  
Nguyen (2020) does not claim that all presently existing accounts 
fail to accommodate the positive data. In particular, he concedes that 
Sterken’s (2015a) indexical account can accommodate the positive data. 
Sterken (2015a) argues that a covert indexical in the logical form of 
generics can explain the positive data. On the other hand, Nguyen (2020) 
argues that we do not need to posit any covert structure to explain the 
positive data. He argues for a pragmatic, Neo-Gricean explanation that 
appeals to the varying communicative intentions of speakers. Both 
accounts are specifically developed to accommodate the rampant context-
sensitivity of generics. It should then be no surprise that they can 
accommodate the positive data. 
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For the purposes of this paper, we are content to simply assume 
that only Nguyen’s (2020) and Sterken’s (2015a) accounts can capture the 
positive data. We do not see this as significantly limiting the interest of 
our investigation here. In the next section, we will introduce new data and 
defend linguistic generalizations of broad semantic interest. Moreover, we 
will establish a conditional claim about which account is more preferable 
(when appropriately modified): If the pragmatic account and the indexical 
account are the only accounts that can accommodate the positive data, then 
the indexical account is best. As we endorse Nguyen’s argument from the 
positive data against other accounts, we find the indexical account, at least 
when appropriately modified, the best view on generic meaning.  
Before introducing some new data, let us describe the two accounts 
in some further detail. Among semanticists, it is generally accepted that 
there is a dyadic operator GEN whose syntactic and semantic function is 
like an adverb of quantification (e.g., “usually” and “generally”). Fara 
(2006) argues that adverbial quantifiers can freely quantify over situations 
or individuals. For example, “Scandinavians usually have blue eyes” can 
have roughly the same reading as “most Scandinavians have blue eyes.” 
For simplicity of exposition, we are going to accept Fara’s conjecture and 
assume that GEN also can freely quantify over either individuals or 
situations. If GEN quantifies over situations, generic sentences have 
habitual readings (e.g., “Mary smokes,” “Steve runs,” etc.). If GEN 
quantifies over individuals, then they have individual (or I-generic) 
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readings (e.g., “Barns are red,” “Ravens are black,” etc.). In this paper, we 
focus on individual readings of generic sentences.  
The main difference between Sterken (2015a) and Nguyen (2020) 
lies in whether GEN is posited. Sterken (2015a) posits GEN. But on her 
account, GEN is not any particular quantifier. Instead, it is an indexical 
over quantifiers. There are broadly two ways to formulate this claim. One 
is to say that the semantic value of GEN is determined by a Kaplanian 
character (Kaplan 1989). The other is to say that its semantic value is not 
determined but merely constrained by some semantic component (Cooper 
1983; Heim and Kratzer 1998). 6  Either way, her indexical theory is 
flexible enough to capture the positive data. On her view, quantifiers can 
range over merely possible situations as well as actual ones. Moreover, 
 
6 Kaplan (1989) distinguishes between pure indexicals (e.g., “I”, “here”, “now”, etc.) and 
true demonstratives (e.g., “he”, “she”, “that”, etc.). In the case of pure indexicals, the 
linguistic conventions that constitute the meaning of a pure indexical (= characters) 
determine the referent of an indexical in a given (public) context (e.g., the speaker, the 
time, the location of the utterance). For example, when one uses “I”, the speaker 
automatically refers to herself. No pointing or intentions are required to determine its 
referent. But in the case of true demonstratives, the conventional meaning of a 
demonstrative does not automatically determine its referent in a given (public) context. 
Demonstratives require the speaker’s demonstrations or intentions to fix their referent. 
The main difference between pure indexicals and true demonstratives is whether the 
conventional meaning of an expression automatically determine its referent in a given 
(public) context or not. This is what we wish to capture by distinguishing the Heim and 
Kratzer account from the Kaplanian account. On Kaplan’s character-based account, the 
conventional meaning of a pronoun automatically determines its referent in a context. On 
Heim and Kratzer’s account, the conventional meaning of a pronoun just constrains, but 
not determines, its referent.  
      Furthermore, there is a difference in formalizations between the two. On the 
Kaplanian account, the meaning of a pure indexical is a character, which is a function 
from (public) contexts to contents. On Heim and Kratzer’s account, the meaning of a 
pronoun is defined in terms of a variable assignment function, and the variable 
assignment function is a function from indices to individuals. The variable assignment 
function represents the utterance context, but Heim and Kratzer’s notion of context 
should be understood as including the speaker’s intentions, so that it shouldn’t be 
confused with Kaplan’s narrow notion of context. 
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GEN can in principle have any quantifier as its semantic value. Therefore, 
Sterken can handily accommodate the positive data. For example, 
Sterken’s view captures the truth of (6) by allowing GEN to have the 
semantic value of a particular quantifier over ideal situations: This 
quantifier has the meaning of “all ideal.” 
On the other hand, according to Nguyen (2020), generic sentences 
fail to express propositions. He does not posit GEN. He leaves it open 
whether the logical form of “Fs are Gs” is just “[Fx][Gx]” or 
“Ux[Fx][Gx],” 7  where U is a syntactically real but semantically null 
operator. So, its quantificational force should be supplied by a pragmatic 
process (e.g., Bach’s (1994) impliciture, Recanati’s (2004) free 
enrichment, Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) explicature). On Nguyen’s view, 
speakers use generics to convey propositions built out of the non-
propositional semantic content of the uttered generic. Which 
proposition—built out of the non-propositional content—is conveyed 
depends on the speaker’s communicative intentions. The speaker’s 
communicative intentions are sensitive to the goal of the conversation and 
her beliefs about which propositions her audience will grasp. Here, to 
grasp a proposition is to correctly identify it as a proposition that the 
speaker intends to convey. Nguyen explains the positive data by allowing 
speakers’ communicative intentions to vary significantly in different 
 
7 The former logical form is that of an open sentence. The latter logical form is that of a 
quantified sentence in which a variable is bound by the operator, U, in the quantifier 
position. 
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contexts. On Nguyen’s view, a variety of communicative intentions leads 
to a variety of propositions asserted. 
 To summarize, the key difference between Sterken (2015a) and 
Nguyen (2020), then, is whether there is a semantically effective operator 
or not. Sterken posits GEN. Nguyen does not.  
 
3. The Negative Data and Its Implications 
Let’s now turn our attention to some new data. In this paper, we present 
some new data—which we will call the Negative Data—and develop a 
more sophisticated version of the indexical account to explain the data. 
Our key observation is that there are some quantificational forces that 
generic utterances cannot convey. Consider the following data: 
   
The Negative Data8,9 
(1*) [#Few] mosquitoes transmit malaria. 
 
8 The “#” indicates that the depicted reading is unavailable. For example, (1*) reports 
that one cannot utter “mosquitoes transmit malaria” to non-figuratively mean that few 
mosquitos transmit malaria. Note that “few” and “a few” differ in meaning. “a few” is 
similar to “many” and it is upward monotone. “few” is similar to “not many” and it is 
downward monotone. See Barwise and Cooper (1981) for more details.   
9 Here are sample lexical entries for the quantifiers in the negative data: 
⟦“not all”⟧c = λF. λG. 
#(F&G)
#F
 < 1 
⟦“not many”⟧c = λF. λG. 
#(F&G)
#F
 < 0.3. 
⟦“few”⟧c = λF. λG. 
#(F&G)
#F
 < n, where n is some number very close to 0 (e.g., 0.01). 
⟦“no”⟧c = λF. λG. 
#(F&G)
#F
 = 0. 
⟦“at most half”⟧c = λF. λG. 
#(F&G)
#F
  ≤ 0.5. 
⟦“exactly five”⟧c = λF. λG. #(F&G) = 5. 




(2*) [#Not many] barns are red. 
(3*) [#Not all] prime numbers are odd. 
(4*) [#At most half of the] ravens [in the zoo] are black. 
(5*) [#By definition, no] squares are round. 
(6*) [#At least five] girls cry. 
(7*) [#Exactly five] orange crushers [can] crush oranges. 
 
These quantificational readings are not available. Neither Sterken’s 
(2015a) nor Nguyen’s (2020) account fares well with the negative data. 
The negative data is evidence against the pragmatic approach. If the 
quantificational force of generics is pragmatically supplied, there seems to 
be no reason why they could not be enriched so as to make these readings 
available. There was a similar debate over the linguistic status of domain 
restriction between Recanati (2004) and Stanley (2007). Recanati (2004) 
accounts for domain restriction in terms of free enrichment but does not 
mention any pragmatic constraint on free enrichment. Stanley (2007, 
p.238) objects that Recanati’s account then overgenerates readings. For 
example, “Every Frenchman is seated” can be used to express what “Every 
Frenchman in the classroom is seated” expresses (set intersection) but not 
what “Every Frenchman or Dutchman is seated” expresses (set union). 
Similarly, “Every Frenchman is seated” cannot be used to express the 
proposition that “Every non-Frenchman is seated” expresses 
(complement). Analogously, Nguyen’s (2020) account may fare well with 
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the positive data, but it seems unable to capture the negative data. This is 
a significant problem for his view. 
Sterken’s (2015a) account, as it is now, does not fare well with the 
negative data either. On Sterken’s account, GEN is an indexical over 
quantifiers. But she doesn’t specify what kind of indexical GEN is. As we 
can see from the negative data, GEN cannot take quantifiers like “no,” 
“not all,” “at least five,” “at most half,” “exactly five,” etc as its value. But 
Sterken provides no good reason why GEN cannot take such quantifiers 
as its value.   
In summary, given Nguyen’s argument from the positive data 
against other accounts, only Sterken’s indexical account and Nguyen’s 
pragmatic account can explain the positive data. However, these two 
accounts still fail to explain the negative data. Thus, there is no available 
account on the market that can explain both the positive data and the 
negative data. In the remainder of this paper, we will develop a new 
version of the indexical account to accommodate those two sets of data. 
The basic strategy is that since GEN is semantically active, it may carry 
semantic features that rule out the quantificational forces in the negative 
data. More specifically, in Section 4, we argue that GEN carries the 
following two semantic constraints: upward monotonicity and non-
symmetry. In Section 5, we argue that the same strategy is not available 
for the pragmatic account. 
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4. The Semantic Features of GEN 
4.1. Two generalizations 
As mentioned earlier, there are two approaches to indexicals and pronouns: 
Kaplanian characters (Kaplan, 1989) and semantic constraints (Cooper 
1983; Heim & Kratzer, 1998). We will adopt the second approach here. 
On this approach, just as the pronoun “she” comes with a semantic 
constraint that its semantic value be female, GEN may come with certain 
semantic constraints. Semantic constraints provide conditions that must be 
satisfied for an expression to be semantically interpretable (i.e., for it to 
have a defined semantic value). 
Before investigating what semantic constraints GEN comes with, 
let us first explain the logical structure of quantified sentences and two 
important logical properties of quantifiers: monotonicity and symmetry. A 
quantifier is considered having a tripartite structure: (i) quantificational 
force, (ii) restrictor argument, and (iii) scope argument. The 
quantificational force specifies how strong a quantifier is. The restrictor 
argument specifies the domain over which the quantifier ranges. The scope 
argument specifies the property that is attributed to those members 
provided by the restrictor argument. For example, the logical form of the 
sentence “all tigers are striped” can be represented as “all x [tiger 
(x)][striped (x)],” according to which the quantifier “all” takes “tigers” 
(i.e., the restrictor argument) and “be striped” (i.e., the scope argument) as 
its arguments.  
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Here, we are going to confine our attention to the scope argument 
of a quantifier and define upward and downward monotonicity as follows: 
Given any scope argument A, the quantifier Q is upward monotone iff for 
any B and C such that B entails C, Q(A)(B) entails Q(A)(C). Q is 
downward monotone iff for any B and C such that B entails C, Q(A)(C) 
entails Q(A)(B). Q is monotone iff it is either upward or downward 
monotone. Q is non-monotone iff it is neither upward nor downward 
monotone. 
To fix ideas, let us consider some examples. Some examples of 
upward monotone quantifiers are “some,” “at least five,” “a few,” 
“many,”10  “most,” and “all.” Some examples of downward monotone 
quantifiers are “no,” “not all,” “not many,” “few,” “at most half,” and “at 
most two.” Finally, “exactly five” and “between two and seven” are non-
monotone quantifiers (Barwise and Cooper, 1981; Peters and Westerstahl, 
2006; Westerstahl, 2019). 
The other logical property that we are interested in is symmetry. A 
quantifier Q is symmetric iff for any A and B, Q(A)(B) iff Q(B)(A). Q is 
non-symmetric iff there are some A and B such that Q(A)(B) and Q(B)(A) 
have distinct truth-values. Existential quantifiers such as “some,” “at least 
five,” “exactly five,” and cardinal “many” are symmetric. On the other 
 
10 It is widely accepted that quantifiers like “many,” “a few,” “few” have ambiguous 
readings (i.e., cardinal and proportional readings) (Partee 1988). Both cardinal and 
proportional “many” are upward monotone.  
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hand, “all,” “most,” and proportional “many” are non-symmetric (Barwise 
& Cooper, 1981; Peters & Westerstahl, 2006; Westerstahl, 2019). 
To draw proper semantic constraints on GEN, let us make two 
generalizations that we draw from the positive and negative data. We will 
use these generalizations in order to infer which semantic constraints to 
impose on GEN: 
 
Generalization 1: The quantifiers in the positive data (e.g., proportional 
“a few,” proportional “many,” “most,” “almost all,” “all”) are all upward 
monotone and non-symmetric.   
 
Generalization 2: The quantifiers in the negative data (e.g., “few,” “not 
many,” “not all,” “no,” “at most half,” “at least five,” “exactly five”) are 
either downward monotone, non-monotone, or symmetric.  
 
Generalization 1 seems intuitively plausible from considering generic 
utterances in various contexts. It seems that the quantifiers involved in the 
positive data (e.g. “a few” and “all”) are all upward monotone. 
Furthermore, other approaches also entail that generics are upward 
monotone. For example, according to normalcy-based approaches (Asher 
& Morreau, 1995; Pelletier & Asher, 1997), generics of the form “Fs are 
Gs” are roughly analyzed as “all normal Fs are Gs.” Also, on probabilistic 
accounts (Cohen, 1996, 1999, 2004a,b), “Fs are Gs” are roughly analyzed 
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as “most Fs are Gs” or “many Fs are Gs.” Since “all,” “most,” and “many” 
are upward monotone, several other approaches on generics are also 
committed to the upward monotonicity of generics. 
One might object at this point that there seem to be 
counterexamples to Generalization 1 such as the following: 
  
(8) a. Lions are on the lawn. (Existential Bare Plurals) 
      b. Auto mechanics are available.  
(9) a. A: Birds lay eggs. (Existential Generics)  
          B: Mammals lay eggs too.  
      b. A: No Indians eat beef.  
          B: That’s not true. Indians do eat beef! 
(10) a. Dutchmen are good sailors. (Port Royal Examples) 
        b. ⇏ Dutchmen are sailors. 
(11) a. Bulgarians are good weightlifters. 
        b. ⇏ Bulgarians are weightlifters. 
(12) a. Bears are brown, black, and white. (Conjunctive Generics) 
        b. ⇏ Bears are brown.  
(13) a. Chickens lay eggs. (Alternative-Sensitivity) 
        b. ⇏ Chickens are female. 
 
(i) Existential Bare Plurals: If GEN is non-symmetric, generics 
shouldn’t be able to have an existential quantificational force, because the 
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existential quantifier “some” is a symmetric quantifier. But (8a) and (8b) 
seem to have existential readings. That is, (8a) can mean that some lions 
are on the lawn, and (8b) can mean that some auto mechanics are available. 
However, it is well-known that bare plurals are ambiguous between 
generics and existentials and thus, in addition to generic readings, they can 
at least sometimes have existential readings. If so, (8a) and (8b) express 
simple existential readings and pose no problem for a theory of generics. 
In this paper, we remain neutral on how existential bare plural are 
derived.11 
(ii) Existential Generics: Even if examples like (8a) and (8b) are 
treated as simple existential bare plurals, Cohen (2004a) argues that there 
are true generics with an existential flavor. He argues that in (9a) and (9b), 
B’s response expresses a generic reading with an existential force. B’s 
response in (9a) has an existential force because it can be true even if 
platypuses and echidnas are the only egg-laying mammals. Also, B’s 
response in (9a) has a generic reading because it expresses a law-like 
generalization that is not temporary but is expected to happen regularly or 
normally in the future. He says that even if no platypuses and echidnas 
happen to lay eggs this year and so no mammals lay eggs this year, the 
sentence “Mammals lay eggs too” would still be true, given that this is just 
a temporary situation and in the future they are expected to lay eggs 
normally. Similarly, he says that B’s response in (9b) has a generic reading 
 
11 For references, see Carlson (1977), Diesing (1992), Kratzer (1995) and Chierchia 
(1998).  
 15 
because, to be true, the sentence “Indians do eat beef” requires some 
instances of Indians who regularly eat beef throughout a long period of 
time.  
As we noted in Section 2, GEN may quantify over either 
individuals or situations. If GEN quantifies over individuals, generic 
sentences have individual readings (e.g., “Barns are red,” “Ravens are 
black,” etc.), and if GEN quantifies over situations, generic sentences have 
habitual readings (e.g., “Mary smokes,” “Steve runs,” etc.). We believe 
that existential generics are not individual-level generics but habituals. 
More specifically, we propose that existential generics arise when the 
existential quantifier mentioned in the discussion of (8) quantifies over 
individuals and GEN quantifies over situations. As a result, “Mammals 
lay eggs, too” has a reading similar to “Some mammals normally lay eggs,” 
and “Indians do eat beef” has a reading closer to “Some Indians regularly 
eat beef.” In those paraphrases, “some” represents the contribution of the 
existential (and non-generic) quantifier, and “normally” or “regularly” 
represent the contribution of GEN.   
(iii) Port Royal Examples: If GEN is upward monotone, (10)−(13) 
should be valid. But those inferences seem invalid. Examples (10)−(13) 
can be broken down into three kinds. Let us consider them one by one. (10) 
and (11) are the classic Port Royal examples. They have traditionally been 
thought to be troublesome for semantic theories of generics. But Leslie 
(2008) argues that if we properly understand the logical forms of the Port 
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Royal examples, they are not troublesome at all. Her solution draws its 
inspiration from Larson’s (1998) proposal for non-generic variants of the 
Port Royal examples.  
 
(14) a. Barry is a good dancer ( Barry’s dancing is good). 
        b. ⇏ Barry is a dancer.  
 
Larson (1998) proposes that when an agentive nominal is modified by an 
adjective, 12  the agentive nominal occurs as a part of the restrictor 
argument, not the scope argument. Leslie (2008) generalizes this solution 
to the generic versions of the Port Royal examples and proposes that 
“sailors” in (10) and “weightlifters” in (11) appear as part of the restrictor 
argument. If Leslie’s (2008) proposal is right, the logical forms of (10a) 
and (11a) would be just like those of (15a) and (15b).  
 
(15) a. Dutch sailors are good (qua sailors).  
        b. Bulgarian weightlifters are good (qua weightlifters).   
 
But (15) does not threaten Generalization 1. Plausibly, being good at 
something entails being adequate at it. But note that (15a) does entail that 
 
12 We believe this phenomenon is not just restricted to agentive nominals or modification 
by adjectives. Consider the following example (Cohen 2001). (L) roughly means that 
most linguists who came did so by bus or that for most events e, if e is a linguist’s coming, 
e is done by bus.  
(L) Most linguists came by bus. 
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Dutch sailors are adequate (qua sailors) and that (15b) does entail that 
Bulgarian weightlifters are adequate (qua weightlifters). Upward 
monotonicity is preserved.  
(iv) Conjunctive Generics: Another issue concerns conjunction. 
“Bears are brown, black, and white” is felicitous, but “Bears are brown” 
is not.13 We believe that this contrast is due to a Quantity-1 implicature—
which requires cooperative speakers to make their conversational 
contributions as informative as is required—in Grice’s (1989) sense. Some 
evidence for this claim is that cancelation is felicitous: “Bears are brown, 
but of course they can also be black or white” is felicitous. This result 
suggests that “Bears are brown” is infelicitous only because an utterance 
of this sentence usually implicates, incorrectly, that bears cannot have 
other colors. To accommodate conjunctive generics like “Bears are brown, 
black, and white,” we follow Leslie (2015) in allowing conjunction to take 
scope over GEN. In other words, “Bears are brown, black, and white” can 
mean “Bears are brown, bears are black, and bears are white.”  
(v) Alternative-Sensitivity: (13) is one of what Leslie (2008) 
classifies as troublesome generics. A common intuition is that “Chickens 
are female” is false even though “Chickens lay eggs” is true and all egg-
laying chickens are female. Cohen (2001) provides a natural explanation 
for this phenomenon. He argues that GEN is sensitive to contextually 
 
13 This latter datapoint is contestable. Some of our informants claim that “Bears are 
brown” is felicitous. If it is indeed felicitous, then of course our account can 
straightforwardly accommodate that. 
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determined alternatives. This should not be surprising, since many 
proportional quantifiers like “many” and “a few” are evaluated relative to 
a set of alternatives. For example, (13a) may be true because it is evaluated 
relative to a set like {giving birth to live young}. On the other hand, (13b) 
may be false because it is evaluated relative to a set like {being male}. 
There can be many ways to implement alternative-sensitivity in a formal 
system. For example, alternative sets can be understood as sets of 
properties or sets of propositions. Also, we can compare a generic sentence 
with each alternative in the alternative set, the average of the alternative 
set, or the union of the alternative set, etc. We will return to the issue of 
how to implement alternative-sensitivity in Section 4.2. 
But one might ask why we should think that GEN is, at least 
sometimes, evaluated with respect to alternatives. On the indexical 
approach, GEN is an indexical over quantifiers. If Generalization 1 is 
correct, GEN may denote proportional “a few” and proportional “many.” 
Since proportional “a few” and proportional “many” are alternative-
sensitive (Cohen, 2001), GEN is alternative-sensitive as well when it 
denotes these quantifiers. And perhaps there are non-lexicalized, 
alternative-sensitive, upward monotone quantifiers that GEN can denote. 
Furthermore, there is some independent, empirical data indicating 
that GEN is alternative-sensitive. Note that, as Cohen (2001) observed, 
proportional quantifiers and GEN are not conservative. A quantifier Q is 
conservative iff “Q x [F(x)][G(x)]” is always equivalent to “Q x [F(x)][F(x) 
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∧ G(x)].” For example, “some” is conservative, as evidenced by the 
equivalency of (16a) and (16b). On the other hand, “many” and GEN are 
not conservative, as evidenced, respectively, by the lack of equivalence 
between (17a) and (17b) and the lack of equivalence between (18a) and 
(18b).14 
 
(16) a. Some politicians tell the truth. 
        b. Some politicians are politicians who tell the truth. 
(17) a. Many Scandinavians have won the Nobel Prize in Literature. 
        b. Many Scandinavians are Scandinavians who have won the Nobel       
            Prize in Literature. 
(18) a. Mosquitoes transmit malaria. 
        b. Mosquitoes are mosquitoes that transmit malaria. 
 
(16a) and (16b) entail one another. This result indicates that “some” is 
conservative. On the other hand, (17a) does not entail (17b). After all, (17a) 
is true even though (17b) is false.15 So, “many” is not conservative. Finally, 
 
14 Cohen (2001) discusses (17) and agrees with our judgment that (17a) does not entail 
(17b). 
15 The Nobel Prize in Literature is an award for which authors of any nationality are 
eligible. As of 2019, 16 of the 116 recipients were Scandinavians. For some comparison: 
11 were American, one was Chinese, and one was Indian. Given these facts, (17a) seems 
true to us. If you disagree, then you may imagine that all 116 previous recipients were 
Scandinavian. In such a scenario, (17a) is obviously true and (17b) is still false. 
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(18a) does not entail (18b). After all, (18a) is true even though (18b) is 
false.16 
 So, GEN is not conservative. But this then indicates that GEN is 
evaluated with respect to contextually determined alternatives. Intuitively, 
conservative quantifiers only see objects that have the restrictor property. 
For example, the truth of “Some dogs bark” depends only on the behavior 
of dogs, not on the behavior of non-dogs. On the other hand, non-
conservative quantifiers see objects that do not have the restrictor property. 
For example, the truth of (17a) can depend on how many non-
Scandinavians have won the Nobel Prize in Literature.17 Holding fixed the 
fact that 16 Scandinavians have won this award, it would make a 
difference to our assessment of (17a)’s truth whether only one non-
Scandinavian or over five thousand non-Scandinavians have won the 
award. But this attention to individuals that do not have the restrictor 
property indicates that non-conservative quantifiers are alternative-
sensitive. Since GEN is non-conservative, it follows that the truth-value 
of a generic “Fs G” can, at least sometimes, depend on the properties of 
non-Fs. 
To summarize, there is an independent reason for why the 
inference from (13a) to (13b) sounds invalid. That is, (13a) and (13b) 
 
16  Less than 1% of mosquitoes transmit malaria. There are over 3,000 species of 
mosquitoes and only the females of one species are capable of transmitting malaria. 
Given these facts, we judge (18a) to be still be true even though (18b) is false.  
17 We ignore the absolute proportional reading of “many” here. This is appropriate as we 
are only interested in its relative proportional reading. To help aid us in focusing on the 
intended reading here, assume that 16 of 116 does not count as absolutely many 
Scandinavians. 
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might have different truth-values because they are evaluated relative to 
different alternative sets.18 If this is the case, there is an implicit context 
change in the above inference from (13a) to (13b). If so, then (13a) and 
(13b) do not constitute a genuine counterexample to Generalization 1. 
That is, given that generics are at least sometimes alternative-sensitive, we 
can preserve the upward monotonicity of generics. The quantificational 
force of generic utterances is always upward monotone. 
Upward monotonicity is sufficient to single out the quantifiers in 
the positive data (i.e., proportional “a few,” proportional “many,” “most,” 
“almost all,” “all”). So, one might question why we include non-symmetry 
in Generalization 1. We do so because non-symmetry is necessary to 
explain the negative data. Upward monotonicity explains why GEN 
cannot be used to express downward monotone quantifiers like “few,” 
“not many,” “not all,” “no,” “at most half” and non-monotone quantifiers 
like “exactly five” (Peters and Westerstahl 2006, Section 5.2.). But it 
doesn’t explain why GEN cannot be used to express upward monotone 
cardinal quantifiers like “at least five”. Non-symmetry can be used to 
exclude these quantifiers, because they are symmetric. For example, “at 
least five” is symmetric because “At least five(x)[F(x)][G(x)]” is true iff 
 
18  We believe this generalizes to other seeming non-Port-Royal counterexamples to 
Generalization 1. For example, suppose that 1% of Frenchmen regularly eat horsemeat 
and that no Frenchmen eat any other kinds of meat. In such a situation, “Frenchmen eat 
horsemeat” seems true but “Frenchmen eat meat” seems false. This is so even though any 
Frenchman who eats horsemeat eats meat. Alternative sensitivity captures this data in a 
satisfying way. Given alternative sensitivity, we can say that “Frenchmen eat meat” is 
false since Frenchmen are so much less likely to eat meat than those of other nationalities. 
Moreover, we can say that “Frenchmen eat horsemeat” is true since Frenchmen are so 
much more likely to eat horsemeat than those of other nationalities. 
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“At least five(x)[G(x)][F(x)] is true. If at least five boys run, then at least 
five runners are boys—and vice-versa. Therefore, there is good reason to 
include non-symmetry in Generalization 1.19 
Generalization 2 seems plausible upon reflection. Any instance of 
the negative data seems to involve a downward monotone, non-monotone, 
or symmetric quantifier. Our defense of Generalization 1 partially 
supports this generalization. But we can say more in defense of 
Generalization 2. We will use a three-pronged strategy. First, we will 
appeal to data about NPIs (negative polarity items) to show that generics 
do not involve downward monotone quantifiers. Second, we will appeal 
to data about inference patterns involving conjunctive predicates to show 
that generics do not involve non-monotone quantifiers. Third, we will 
appeal to data about inference patterns to show that generics do not 
involve symmetric quantifiers. Since Generalization 2 just says that 
generics do not involve downward monotone, non-monotone, or 
symmetric quantification, our three-pronged strategy directly supports 
Generalization 2. 
 
19 The negative data suggests that GEN cannot take the same quantificational forces as 
“few,” “not many,” “not all,” “at most half,” “no,” “at least five,” and “exactly five.” 
“Few,” “not many,” “not all,” “at most half,” and “no” are downward monotone, and 
“exactly five” is non-monotone, so they are excluded by the upward monotonicity 
condition (Peters and Westerstahl 2006, Section 5.2.). “No,” “at least five,” and “exactly 
five” are symmetric, so they are excluded by the non-symmetry condition (Westerstahl 
2019, Section 13). “No” and “exactly five” are excluded by either condition.    
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Let us proceed. First, the hypothesis that generics cannot involve 
downward monotone quantifiers is empirically supported by the 
observation that they do not license NPIs like “at all” and “ever”: 
  
(19) # Ravens are black at all. 
(20) # Chickens ever lay eggs. 
 
The most popular account of how NPIs get licensed is the downward 
entailment account (Ladusaw, 1980). On this account, NPIs can only 
appear in downward entailing contexts. So, if GEN is downward entailing, 
(19) and (20) should be grammatically acceptable. But they are not. 
Observe the contrast with uncontroversially downward entailing 
quantifiers such as “no” and “few.” 
 
(21) No ravens are black at all. 
(22) Few chickens ever lay eggs. 
  
While this account of NPIs has recently been put into doubt, its main 
competitor, Giannakidou’s (2002) non-veridicality account, also entails 
that downward entailing contexts license NPIs. Therefore, the distribution 
of NPIs in generics indicates that generics cannot involve downward 
monotone quantifiers. 
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Next, we wish to point out some data on inference patterns 
involving conjunctive predicates that suggest generics cannot involve non-
monotone quantifiers. Observe that (23a) asymmetrically entails (23b), 
that (24b) asymmetrically entails (24a), and that neither (25a) nor (25b) 
entails the other: 
 
(23) a. All writers are observant and creative. 
        b. All writers are observant. 
(24) a. No writers are observant and creative. 
        b. No writers are observant. 
(25) a. Exactly five writers are observant and creative. 
        b. Exactly five writers are observant. 
 
(23a) entails (23b) because “all” is upward monotone. (24b) entails (24a) 
because “no” is downward monotone. Neither (25a) nor (25b) entails the 
other because “exactly five” is non-monotone. For our purposes here, it is 
most important to note that, if Q is a non-monotone quantifier, then neither 
“Q x [F(x)][G(x)]” nor “Q x [F(x)][G(x) ∧ H(x)]” entails the other. So if 
generics can sometimes involve non-monotone quantification, we should 
predict that generics sometimes pattern like (25). However, (26) and (27) 
show that this prediction does not hold: 
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(26) a. Ravens are black and omnivorous.20  
        b. Ravens are black. 
(27) a. Truth tables are tedious and boring. 
        b. Truth tables are tedious. 
 
In fact, in each of (26) and (27), the (a)-sentence entails the corresponding 
(b)-sentence. So, if anything, generics pattern like (23), not (25). This 
result should not be surprising; Generalization 1 predicts this outcome.21 
Since generics do not pattern like sentences involving non-monotone 
quantification, we infer that generics do not involve non-monotone 
quantification. 
But there is a seeming counterexample to the claim that generics 
do not involve non-monotone quantification. Consider (28): 
 
(28) a. Frenchmen eat horsemeat. 
        b. Frenchmen eat meat. 
 
It seems that neither (28a) nor (28b), strictly speaking, entails the other. 
To see that (28a) does not entail (28b), imagine a world just like ours 
except only 1% of Frenchmen ever eat horsemeat and this is the only sort 
 
20 “Ravens are black and omnivorous” seems ambiguous between the following two: one 
in which GEN takes scope over conjunction and one in which conjunction takes scope 
over GEN. Here, we are interested in the first reading. On this reading, (26a) roughly 
means that for most x, if x is a raven, x is black and omnivorous.  
21 (26) and (27) thus provide further evidence for Generalization 1. 
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of meat that any Frenchmen ever eats. Even though the only meat any 
Frenchmen eat in our hypothetical scenario is horsemeat, it is still 
distinctive of Frenchmen that they eat horsemeat. Yet, it is relatively rare 
for a Frenchmen to eat meat at all. In such a scenario, (28a) is intuitively 
true and (28b) is intuitively false. To see that (28b) does not entail (28a) 
is easier. Imagine that every Frenchmen regularly eats meat—say, beef—
but that no Frenchman ever eats horsemeat. In such a scenario, (28b) is 
intuitively true and (28a) is intuitively false. So, neither (28a) nor (28b) 
entails the other. But then wouldn’t this be evidence that generics can 
sometimes pattern like (25) and thus that it is possible for generics involve 
non-monotone quantification? 
 Our response to this purported counterexample will be in effect the 
same as our response to the purported counterexample that (13) posed to 
Generalization 1. We believe that alternative sensitivity is in play. 
Basically, (28a) and (28b) are evaluated with respect to different contexts. 
When evaluating (28a), we are intuitively comparing the proportion of 
Frenchmen who eat horsemeat against the proportion of Peruvians who 
eat horsemeat, the proportion of Koreans who eat horsemeat, the 
proportion of Ethiopians who eat horsemeat, etc. As it is relatively 
distinctive of Frenchmen that they eat horsemeat—even if only 1% of 
them eat horsemeat—this makes it easier for (28a) to be true than (28b) to 
be true. After all, when evaluating (28b), we are intuitively comparing the 
proportion of Frenchmen who eat meat against the proportion of Peruvians 
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who eat meat, the proportion of Koreans who eat meat, the proportion of 
Ethiopians who eat meat, etc. We believe that if it were not for the 
distorting effects of alternative sensitivity, it would be transparent that 
(28a) entails (28b). But given the presence of alternative sensitivity, it is 
in practice very difficult to evaluate (28a) and (28b) with respect to the 
same context and thus the same set of alternatives. Therefore, (28) does 
not present a decisive objection to our claim that generics cannot involve 
non-monotone quantification. We will come back to the issue of how to 
implement this idea in a formal system in Section 4.2. 
Lastly, we wish to point out data on inference patterns that suggest 
generics are not symmetric. A quantifier Q is symmetric when Q(A)(B) 
iff Q(B)(A). “Some” is a typical example of a symmetric quantifier. 
“Some student lives in Los Angeles” is truth-conditionally equivalent to 
“Someone who lives in Los Angeles is a student.” However, (29)–(32) 
suggest that generics are not symmetric. 
 
(29) a. Dogs are four-legged. 
        b. ⇏ Four-legged animals are dogs. 
(30) a. Lions are mammals.  
        b. ⇏ Mammals are lions. 
(31) a. Ducks lay eggs.  
        b. ⇏ Animals that lay eggs are ducks.  
(32) a. Bulgarians are good weightlifters. 
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        b. ⇏ Good weightlifters are Bulgarians.  
 
We conclude that both Generalization 1 and Generalization 2 are secure. 
In the next section, we discuss how to incorporate these generalizations 
into the formal meaning of GEN.  
 
4.2. The formal meaning of GEN 
Based on these two generalizations, we propose to modify the indexical 
approach in a way that accommodates both the positive and negative data. 
It is widely accepted that a lexical item carries a variety of phonological, 
syntactic, and semantic features (Chomsky and Halle 1968, Chomsky 
1981). For example, the English pronoun “he” has features for person, 
gender, and number (also known as phi-features). These features can be 
described as follows: [person: 3], [gender: masculine], [number: singular]. 
These features function as constraints on the possible value of “he.” That 
is, “he” succeeds in semantically denoting something only when its 
denotation is masculine, singular, and neither a speaker nor an addressee. 
On this view, the pronoun “he” can be defined as in (33) (Cooper 1983; 
Heim and Kratzer 1998).  
 
(33) A Lexical Entry for Pronoun “He” 
⟦“Hei”⟧g = defined iff g(i) is masculine, singular, and neither a speaker nor  
                                   an addressee 
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                  if defined, g(i). 
 
Here, g is a contextually determined assignment function that assigns 
semantic values to variables. From the above lexical entry, we see that “he” 
is defined only if its respective semantic constraints are satisfied. 
We propose that just as the pronoun “he” carries person, gender, 
and number features, GEN carries features for monotonicity and 
symmetry. Monotonicity and symmetry have been considered important 
logical properties of quantifiers, because they have been used to explain 
puzzling linguistic phenomena. For example, symmetry was proposed as 
a feature of the quantifiers that are licensed in the so-called existential 
“there”-sentences (e.g., “There are some philosophers in the garden” is 
fine, but “There are most philosophers in the garden” is not) (Peters & 
Westerstahl, 2006, Ch.6.3.). Also, monotonicity plays a crucial 
explanatory role for the distribution of negative polarity items (NPIs). That 
is, negative polarity items such as “ever” and “at all” require a downward 
monotone environment to be licensed (e.g., “No philosopher will ever 
come” is fine but “Some philosopher will ever come” is not) (Ladusaw, 
1980; Peters & Westerstahl, 2006, Ch.5). Thus, if GEN is an indexical 
over quantifiers, it seems not surprising that GEN carries some features 
regarding monotonicity and symmetry.  
Let’s now see how to implement the idea in the meaning of GEN. 
The monotonicity and symmetry features can be described thus: 
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[monotonicity: upward], [symmetry: –]. The first can be read as “GEN has 
the value ‘upward’ for the feature [monotonicity].” The second can be read 
as “GEN has the value ‘–’ for the feature [symmetry].” As phi-features 
function as constraints on the possible value of “he,” monotonicity and 
symmetry features can function as constraints on the possible value of 
GEN. That is, GEN’s semantic constraint requires that its semantic value 
be upward monotone and non-symmetric. On this view, GEN can be 
defined as in (34). 
 
(34) A Lexical Entry for GEN 
⟦“GENi”⟧g = defined iff g(i) is upward monotone and non-symmetric 
                      if defined, g(i). 
  
Here, g is a contextually determined assignment function that assigns a 
semantic value to an index. Both “he” and GEN are defined only if their 
respective semantic constraint is satisfied. If the constraint is satisfied, 
then the expressed semantic content is determined by g. The exact details 
do not concern us here, but in the case of “he,” g (when defined) assigns 
some contextually salient single male individual to an index; in the case 
of GEN, g (when defined) assigns some contextually salient upward 
monotone, non-symmetric quantifier to an index.22  
 
22 For a discussion of a meta-semantic account of how GEN gets the different semantic 
values that it does in different contexts, see Sterken (2015a). Roughly, the account 
sketched there says that, in any context c, GEN has as its semantic value a quantifier that 
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 Before moving on, we’d like to mention two things. First, one 
might wonder how alternative sensitivity enters the picture. Our response 
is that we don’t have to encode alternative sensitivity in the meaning of 
GEN. On the indexical approach, GEN is an indexical over quantifiers, 
and some quantifiers (e.g., “many,” “a few,” etc.) are alternative-sensitive 
(Cohen, 2001). If GEN denotes an alternative-sensitive quantifier, it will 
exhibit alternative-sensitivity. If it denotes an alternative-insensitive 
quantifier (e.g., “all,” “almost all,” etc.), it won’t exhibit alternative-
sensitivity.      
For example, suppose that the meaning of proportional “many” is 
given as follows: 
 
(35) A Lexical Entry for Proportional “Many” 
⟦“Many”⟧c = λF<e,t>. λG<e,t>. 
#(F&G)
#F
  c, where (i) c is some contextually 
salient large number and (ii) if the contrast class Cont(c) is non-empty, c 
is significantly greater than the average proportion of the contrast class 
Cont(c).  
 
Condition (ii) is borrowed from Kennedy (1999, 2007). According to the 
above lexical entry, the semantic value of proportional “many” is well-
defined only when both presuppositions (i) and (ii) are satisfied. If both 
 
both (i) the speaker intends to convey in c and that (ii) a reasonable audience would 
recognize that the speaker intends to convey in c. 
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presuppositions are met, proportional “many” is upward monotone 






. So if 
#(F&G)
#F




 must meet this threshold too. For example, if “Many 
students in my class are from LA” is true, “Many students in my class are 
from California” is true as well.  (35) correctly predicts this result. 
Let’s now return to generics and consider some concrete examples. 
(26) is a good example of upward monotonicity and (28) is a seeming 
counterexample to upward monotonicity. 
 
(26) a. Ravens are black and omnivorous.  
        b. ⇒ Ravens are black. 
(28) a. Frenchmen eat horsemeat. 
        b. ⇏ Frenchmen eat meat. 
 
(35) gives us an intuitively plausible explanation of the above examples. 
(28a) is true because the salient contrast class for (28a) is {Americans eat 
horsemeat, Canadians eat horsemeat, Germans eat horsemeat, etc.} while 
the contrast class for (28b) is {Americans eat meat, Canadians eat meat, 
Germans eat meat, etc.}. (28a) is true because the proportion of 
Frenchmen eating horsemeat over Frenchmen is significantly greater than 
the average proportion of its contrast class. On the other hand, (28b) is not 
true because the proportion of Frenchmen eating meat over Frenchmen is 
not significantly greater than the average proportion of its contrast class. 
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Since (28a) and (28b) are evaluated relative to different contrast classes, 
there is an implicit context shift between them. So, (28) doesn’t constitute 
a counterexample to upward monotonicity.  
 On the other hand, (26) is valid. It is intuitive that (26) isn’t 
evaluated with respect to contrast classes. This is because (26a) and (26b) 
would still be felicitous no matter how many raven-alternative creatures 
are black and omnivorous. For example, (26a) and (26b) would be true 
even in contexts in which the only contextually salient raven-alternative 
creatures are crows. When the contrast class Cont(c) is empty, Condition 
(ii) is trivially satisfied. As we mentioned earlier, when all presuppositions 
are satisfied, proportional “many” is upward monotone. Thus, it is not 
surprising that the inference from (26a) to (26b) is valid.  
 Second, we are open to the possibility that GEN could be subject 
to further constraints. One possible constraint is a constraint on GEN’s 
modal forces. Examples like (4), (6), and (7) are naturally interpreted as 
carrying some modal force. Thus, one might suggest that GEN always 
comes with some modal force: actual, possible, normal, deontic, etc. On 
this view, (1)−(3) can be considered carrying actual force, (4) normal force, 
(6) deontic force, and (7) dispositional force. This constraint might be 
needed to explain the phenomenon that (36) can be used to express (37) 
but cannot be used to express (38) and (39): 
 
(36) Ravens are black. 
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(37) [All normal] ravens are black 
(38) [#All] ravens [in the zoo] are black. 
(39) [#All black] ravens are black.  
 
While (37) expresses a modalized quantificational force, (38) and (39) do 
not. This observation is also consistent with the common assumption that 
generics do not carry any domain restriction device. 23  The constraint 
discussed here can simply be added to the definition of GEN as follows:24 
 
(40) ⟦“GENi”⟧g = defined iff g(i) is upward monotone, non-symmetric,  
                                               and modalized 
 
23 Leslie (2007) argues that if generics allow for domain restriction, “Ducks don’t lay 
eggs” and “Ducks are female” should be fine, because we should be able to restrict the 
domain to either just male or just female ducks. But they are not fine. So, it seems that 
generics do not allow for domain restriction. 
24 A reviewer asks if further constraints are necessary in order to prevent overgenerating 
true readings of generics. For example, nothing in (34) or (40) prevent “Prime numbers 
are odd” from being given a true reading. For example, if GEN were assigned to a 
quantifier (e.g., “most (actual)”) whose force is weaker than that of universal 
quantification, our semantics predicts that “Prime numbers are odd” is true. But normally, 
this generic is infelicitous and false. In reply, we will make two points. First, Sterken 
(2015a) and Nguyen (2020) have shown that “Prime numbers are odd” can be felicitous 
in some contexts. For example, if a classmate had to guess whether an arbitrarily chosen 
prime number were odd but had no idea whether prime numbers were more likely to be 
odd or even, another classmate could felicitously utter “Prime numbers are odd” as a hint. 
Here, the quantificational force seems to be that of “most.” So, in fact, a semantics that 
predicted “Prime numbers are odd” could never be true would objectionably 
undergenerate true readings. Second, this broad overgeneration worry can be applied not 
just to indexical accounts of generics like ours and Sterken’s (2015a), but—as Sterken 
(2015a) points out—also to the best available accounts on quantifier domain restriction, 
pronoun resolution, and gradable adjectives (with respect to the selection of a particular 
comparison class). Somehow pragmatics, broadly understood, plays a pivotal role in 
resolving the relevant contextual parameters for all of these phenomena. Even though we 
have no general answer to the question of what value GEN is assigned in a particular 
context, we do not find this result problematic. The problem of systematizing how 
contextual parameters are resolved is a problem for many theorists working on various 
semantic topics. Resolving this problem is a task for future work. All we can say now is 
that, just as pronouns are interpreted to refer to contextually appropriate individuals, GEN 
is also interpreted to denote contextually appropriate quantifiers. 
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                             if defined, g(i). 
  
4.3. GEN as the default mode of generalization 
In this section, we present a new observation. That is, not only GEN but 
also some other pronoun has the upward monotonicity constraint. The 
discussion in this section might be somewhat speculative, but we believe 
that this section inspires optimism that it is principled and not ad hoc to 
constrain GEN to be upward monotone.  
Let’s start with our observation. According to Wellwood (2019), 
“much” is a pronoun for measure functions (i.e., a function from entities 
or events to degrees). For our purposes, it is important to note that the 
denotation of “much” is restricted to those that are upward monotone.  
 
(41) Ann bought as much coffee as Bill. (volume/weight o, temperature x)  
(42) Ann ran as much as Bill did. (distance/duration o, speed x) 
 
“Much coffee” can be used to express a measure by volume or weight but 
not by temperature. Similarly, “run ... much” can be used to express a 
comparison by distance or duration, but not by speed. Note that for two 
objects x, y, when x is a part of y, the volume/weight of x ≤  the 
volume/weight of y. But it doesn’t always hold that the temperature of x 
≤ the temperature of y. Similarly, for two events e1, e2, when e1 is a part 
of e2, the distance/duration of e1 ≤ the distance/duration of e2. But there is 
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no guarantee that the speed of e1 ≤ the speed of e2. Degree semanticists 
have tried to capture this linguistic phenomenon by using a particular 
semantic constraint. That is, the semantic value of “much” is restricted to 
upward monotone measure functions (Nakanishi, 2004, 2007; 
Schwarzschild, 2002, 2006; Wellwood, 2019). To summarize, GEN and 
“much” are both a kind of pronoun and they carry the upward 
monotonicity constraint.   
Is there a deeper explanation for why GEN and “much” come with 
the same semantic constraint? We might find an answer in Leslie’s (2008) 
suggestion that generics express the default mode of generalization, which 
is innate to us. When there is a sentence with no explicit quantifier, GEN 
is supplied by default. However, she doesn’t provide any formal 
explanation of what this default mode of generalization is. 25  We can 
accept Leslie’s (2008) claim that generics express our default mode of 
generalization. Our novel suggestion is that GEN does not express a 
particular kind of generalization but covers a certain range of 
generalizations—upward monotone, non-symmetric generalizations. So, 
assuming that GEN and “much” are both a sort of pronoun, it seems that 
 
25 What we mean by this claim is that Leslie does not offer an explanatory formal 
semantics for GEN. In both Leslie (2007) and Leslie (2008), she gives a merely 
disquotational semantics for GEN. On this view, the logical form of a generic “Fs G” just 
is “GEN x [F(x)] [G(x)],” and there is nothing more for formal semantics to say on the 
issue. However, Leslie (2007) and Leslie (2008) do offer metaphysical truth conditions 
for the truth of a generic. But not only are these metaphysical truth conditions not 
semantically derived, but we also agree with Sterken’s (2015b) objections to Leslie’s 
view. Not only are there counterexamples to Leslie’s proposed metaphysical truth 
conditions, but a semantics for generics should also predict that generics are context-
sensitive. Leslie’s disquotational semantics does not satisfy this latter condition. Thanks 
to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging us to discuss these issues. 
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the above two seemingly independent phenomena can be explained by the 
same mechanism if upward monotonicity is constitutive of our default 
mode of generalization.26  
 
5. A Reply from Pragmatic Constraints? 
In the previous section, we have developed a novel version of the indexical 
view that accommodates both the positive data and the negative data. One 
might wonder if the same strategy can be applied to the pragmatic 
approach. Just as the indexical approach can accommodate the negative 
data by positing the right semantic constraint on GEN, proponents of the 
pragmatic view might claim that the pragmatic view can be saved if we 
posit the right pragmatic constraints on free enrichment.27 
Many pragmatic theorists (e.g., Carston, 2004; Hall 2014; Recanati, 
2004; Sperber & Wilson, 1986) claim that there should be some pragmatic 
constraints on pragmatic processes like free enrichment. But there is a 
problem: They argue for the existence of pragmatic constraints but do 
not—when they do specify any at all—specify plausible and generalizable 
 
26 It is noteworthy that upward monotone quantifiers seem cognitively prior to downward 
monotone or non-monotone quantifiers. There is empirical evidence for this claim. 
Keenan and Westerstahl (2011) propose that all lexicalized quantifiers are monotone 
(whether upward or downward) and that almost all of them are upward monotone. Katsos 
et al. (2016) performed a cross-linguistic study suggesting that five-year-old children 
understand upward monotone quantifiers better than they do downward monotone 
quantifiers. Steinert-Threlkeld and Szymanik (2019) have developed a short-term 
memory neural network that learned upward monotone quantifiers more quickly than 
non-monotone quantifiers. 
27 Free enrichment, or pragmatic enrichment, is not free in the sense that anything goes. 
As Carston puts it, free enrichment is “the process of recovering unarticulated 
constituents...where what the process is ‘free’ from is linguistic control; obviously, it is 
tightly constrained by the pragmatic principles involved” (Carston 2004, pp. 818−819).  
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constraints. After all, we need to be confident that these pragmatic 
constraints help explain both the positive and negative data even if the 
semantic contents of generics are mere propositional radicals in need of 
pragmatic enrichment. Proponents of the pragmatic approach need 
pragmatic constraints that do very specific work. For example, Nguyen 
(2020) uses Gricean conversational maxims to explain the positive data. 
But the negative data cannot be so easily explained. Suppose it is both true 
and conversationally relevant that not many mosquitoes transmit malaria. 
Nonetheless, the content of “Mosquitoes transmit malaria” cannot be 
pragmatically enriched so as to (non-figuratively) assert that not many 
mosquitoes transmit malaria. 
Another example is Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) relevance theory, 
on which pragmatic enrichments are allowed when they are sufficiently 
relevant. Here, relevance is a technical notion and is a function of positive 
cognitive effects (e.g., informativity) and additional cognitive processing 
burden. Additional positive cognitive effects lead to more relevance; 
additional cognitive processing cost detracts from relevance. Relevance 
theory claims that irrelevant candidate enrichments would be infelicitous, 
whereas sufficiently relevant ones would be felicitous. However, it is 
unclear why enriching generics with non-symmetric, upward monotone 
quantifiers would often lead to relevance and, on the other hand, enriching 
generics with symmetric, downward monotone, or non-monotone 
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quantifiers would always lead to irrelevance.28 So, on relevance theory, 
the combination of the positive data and the negative data seem 
inexplicable on the pragmatic approach. We know of no viable pragmatic 
theory that will lead to a different result. The burden is on proponents of 
the pragmatic view to provide pragmatic principles that explain the data 
presented so far. If they are unable to do so, then they should adopt the 
indexical approach defended here. 
 
6. Conclusion 
We have presented some new data—the negative data—on generics and 
discussed its implication on the debate. Assuming Nguyen’s contention 
that only the indexical account and the pragmatic account can 
accommodate the positive data, we argued that the indexical account is the 
only extant view that can explain both the positive data and the negative 
data. In this paper, we have developed and defended an improved variant 
of Sterken’s indexical account. We do not deny that there might be other 
accounts that succeed in accommodating both data. But examining all 
possible accounts of generics is beyond the scope of this paper. What we 
hope to have established is that, in the absence of any viable alternative 
explanation of both the positive data and the negative data, we should 
 
28 In footnote 26, we mentioned that upward monotone quantifiers seem cognitively prior 
to downward monotone or non-monotone quantifiers. However, even if upward 
monotone quantifiers are cognitively prior to other quantifiers and thus likely less 
cognitively burdensome to process, why should only enrichments involving upward 
monotone quantifiers be relevant? After all, on relevance theory, any cost in cognitive 
processing could be outweighed by a high enough benefit in informativeness (or some 
other positive cognitive effect).  
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accept an appropriately modified version of the indexical account. At the 
very least, the negative data puts pressure on the main contenders in the 
debate to explain why generic sentences do not have certain interpretations. 
Any empirically adequate theory on generics would need to be flexible 
enough to accommodate the positive data and yet constrained enough to 
accommodate the negative data.29 
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